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Abstract
Motivated by recently discovered privacy attacks
on social networks, we study the problem of
anonymizing the underlying graph of interac-
tions in a social network. We call a graph (k, ℓ)-
anonymous if for every node in the graph there
exist at least k other nodes that share at least ℓ
of its neighbors. We consider two combinatorial
problems arising from this notion of anonymity
in graphs. More specifically, given an input
graph we ask for the minimum number of edges
to be added so that the graph becomes (k, ℓ)-
anonymous. We define two variants of this mini-
mization problem and study their properties. We
show that for certain values of k and ℓ the prob-
lems are polynomial-time solvable, while for oth-
ers they become NP-hard. Approximation algo-
rithms for the latter cases are also given.
1 Introduction
The popularity of online communities and social
networks in recent years has motivated research
on social-network analysis. Though these stud-
ies are useful in uncovering the underpinnings of
human social behavior, they also raise privacy
concerns for the individuals involved.
A social network is usually represented as a
graph, where nodes correspond to individuals
and edges capture relationships between these
individuals. For example, in LinkedIn, an on-
line network of professionals, every link between
two users specifies a professional relationship be-
tween them. In Facebook and Orkut links cor-
respond to friendships. There are online com-
munities that permit any user to access the in-
formation of every node in the graph and view
its neighbors. However, many communities are
increasingly restricting access to the personal
information of other users. For example, in
LinkedIn, a user can only see the profiles of his
own friends and their connections.
In this paper, we consider a scenario where the
owner of a social network would like to release
the underlying graph of interactions for social-
network analysis purposes, while preserving the
privacy of its users. More specifically, the pri-
vate information to be protected is the mapping
of nodes to real-world entities and interconnec-
tions amongst them. Therefore, we design an
anonymization framework that tries to hide the
identity of nodes by creating groups of nodes
that look similar by virtue of sharing many of the
same neighbors. We call such nodes anonymized.
Our goal is to anonymize all nodes of the graph
by introducing minimal changes to the overall
graph structure. In this way we can guaran-
tee that the anonymized graph is still useful for
social-network analysis purposes.
Recently, Backstrom et. al. [4] have shown
that the most simple graph-anonymization tech-
nique that removes the identity of each node in
the graph, replacing it with a random identifi-
cation number instead, is not adequate for pre-
serving the privacy of nodes. Specifically, they
show that in such an anonymized network, there
exists an adversary who can identify target in-
dividuals and the link structure between them.
However, the problem of designing anonymiza-
tion methods against such adversaries is not ad-
dressed in [4].
Following the work of [4], Hay et. al. [7]
have very recently given a definition of graph
anonymity: a graph is k-anonymous if every
node shares the same neighborhood structure
with at least k−1 other nodes. The definition is
recursive, and has some nice properties studied
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in [7]. However, the focus of [7] is mostly on the
properties of the definitions rather than on algo-
rithms to achieve the anonymity requirements.
Motivated by [4] and [7], Zhou and Pei [18]
consider the following definition of anonymity in
graphs: a graph is k-anonymous if for every node
there exist at least k − 1 other nodes that share
isomorphic 1-neighborhoods. They consider the
problem of minimum graph-modifications (in
terms of edge additions) that would lead to
a graph satisfying the anonymity requirement.
Although this definition is interesting, the al-
gorithm presented in [18] is not supported by
theoretical analysis. Further, if the anonymity
definition is extended to consider the neighbor-
hood structure beyond just the immediate 1-
neighborhood of each node, algorithmic tech-
niques quickly become infeasible.
Despite the fact that privacy concerns in
releasing social-network data have been pin-
pointed, there is no agreement on the definition
of privacy or anonymity that should be used for
such data. In this paper, we try to move this
line of research one step forward by proposing a
new definition of graph anonymity that is inline
to a certain extent with the definitions provided
in [7]. Our definition of anonymity is in a sense
less strict than the one proposed in [18]. How-
ever, we consider it to be natural, intuitive and
more amenable to theoretical analysis.
Intuitively our definition aims to protect an
individual from an adversary who knows some
subset of the individual’s neighbors in the graph.
After anonymization, the hope is that the ad-
versary can no longer identify the target indi-
vidual because several other nodes in the graph
will also share this subset of neighbors. Further,
during anonymization, the identifying subset of
neighbors themselves will become distorted and
harder for the adversary to identify.
The Problem: We define a graph to be (k, ℓ)-
anonymous if for every node u in the graph there
exist at least k other nodes that share at least
ℓ of their neighbors with u. In order to meet
this anonymity requirement one could transform
any graph into a complete graph. For a graph
consisting of n nodes this would mean that every
node would share n−2 neighbors with each of the
n−1 other nodes. Although such an anonymiza-
tion would preserve privacy, it would make the
anonymized graph useless for any study. For
this reason we impose the additional requirement
that the minimum number of such edge additions
should be made. The aim is to preserve the util-
ity of the original graph, while at the same time
satisfying the (k, ℓ)-anonymity constraint.
Given k and ℓ we formally define two vari-
ants of the graph-anonymization problem that
ask for the minimum number of edge additions
to be made so that the resulting graph is (k, ℓ)-
anonymous. We show that for certain values of
k and ℓ the problems are polynomial-time solv-
able, while for others they are NP-hard. We also
present simple and intuitive approximation algo-
rithms for these hard instances. To summarize
our contributions:
• We propose a new definition of graph
anonymity building on previously proposed
definitions.
• We provide the first formal algorithmic treat-
ment of the graph-anonymization problem.
Besides graph anonymization, the combinato-
rial problems we study here may also arise in
other domains, e.g., graph reliability. We there-
fore believe that the problem definitions and al-
gorithms we present are of independent interest.
Roadmap: The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2 we summarize the related
work. Section 3 gives the necessary notation
and definitions. Algorithms and hardness results
for different instances of the (k, ℓ)-anonymization
problem are given in Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7. We
conclude in Section 8.
2 Related Work
As mentioned in the Introduction, there has been
some prior work on privacy-preserving releases of
social-network graphs. The authors in [4] show
that the naive approach of simply masking user-
names is not sufficient anonymization. In par-
ticular, they show that, if an adversary is given
the chance to create as few as Θ(log(n)) new ac-
counts in the network, prior to its release, then
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he can efficiently recover the structure of con-
nections between any Θ(log2(n)) nodes chosen
apriori. He can do so by identifying the new ac-
counts that he inserted in to the network. The
focus of [4] is on revealing the power of such ad-
versaries and not on devising methods to protect
against them.
In [7] the authors experimentally evaluate how
much background information about the neigh-
borhood of an individual would be sufficient for
an adversary to uniquely identify that individual
in a naively anonymized graph. Additionally,
a new recursive definition of graph anonymity
is given. The definition says that a graph is
k-anonymous if for every structure query there
exist k nodes that satisfy it. The definition
is constructed for a certain class of structure
queries that query the neighborhood structure
of the nodes. Our definition of anonymity is in-
spired by [7], however it is substantially different.
Moreover, the focus of our work is on the com-
binatorial problems arising from our anonymity
definition.
Very recently, the authors of [18] consider yet
another definition of graph anonymity; a graph
is k-anonymous if for every node there exist at
least k − 1 other nodes that share isomorphic 1-
neighborhoods. This definition of anonymity in
graphs is different from ours. In a sense it is a
more strict one. Moreover, though the algorithm
presented in [18] seems to work well in practice,
no theoretical analysis of its performance is pre-
sented. Finally, extending the privacy definition
to more than just the 1-neighborhood of nodes
causes the algorithms of [18] to quickly become
infeasible.
The problem of protecting sensitive links be-
tween individuals in an anonymized social net-
work is considered in [17]. Simple edge-deletion
and node-merging algorithms are proposed to re-
duce the risk of sensitive link disclosure. This
work is different from ours in that we are pri-
marily interested in protecting the identity of the
individuals while in [17] the emphasis is on pro-
tecting the types of links associated with individ-
uals. Also, the combinatorial problems that we
need to solve in our framework are very different
from the set of problems discussed in [17].
In [6] the authors study the problem of as-
sembling pieces of a graph owned by different
parties privately. They propose a set of crypto-
graphic protocols that allow a group of author-
ities to jointly reconstruct a graph without re-
vealing the identity of the nodes. The graph thus
constructed is isomorphic to a perturbed version
of the original graph. The perturbation consists
of addition and or deletion of nodes and or edges.
Unlike that work, we try to anonymize a single
graph by modifying it as little as possible. More-
over, our methods are purely combinatorial and
no cryptographic protocols are involved.
Korolova et. al. [8] investigate an attack
where an adversary strategically subverts user
accounts. He then uses the online interface pro-
vided by the social network to gain access to lo-
cal neighborhoods and to piece them together to
form a global picture. The authors provide rec-
ommendations on what the lookahead of a social
network should be to render such attacks infeasi-
ble. This work does not consider an anonymized
release of the entire network graph and is thus
different from ours.
Besides graphs, there has been considerable
prior work on anonymizing traditional relational
data sets. The line of work on k-anonymity
found in [1, 11, 9, 12, 14, 10] aims to minimally
suppress or generalize public attributes of indi-
viduals in a database in such a way that every
individual (identifiable by his public attributes)
is hidden in a group of size at least k. Our notion
of graph anonymity draws inspiration from this.
Apart from suppression or generalization tech-
niques, perturbation techniques have also been
used to anonymize relational data sets in [2,
3, 5]. Perturbation-based approaches for graph
anonymization are also considered in [7, 16]; in
that case edges are randomly inserted or deleted
to anonymize the graph. We do not consider
perturbation-based approaches in this paper.
3 Preliminaries
In this section we formalize our definition of
graph anonymity and introduce two natural op-
timization problems that arise from it.
Throughout the paper we assume that the
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social-network graph is simple, i.e., it is undi-
rected, unweighted, and contains no self-loops or
multi-edges. This is an important category of
graphs to study; most of the aforementioned so-
cial networks (Facebook, LinkedIn, Orkut) allow
only bidirectional links and are thus instances
of such simple graphs. We assume that the ac-
tual identifiers of individual nodes are removed
prior to further anonymization. Our definition
for graph anonymity is inspired by the notion
of k-anonymity for relational data wherein each
person, identifiable by his public attributes, is
required to be hidden in a group of size k. In
the case of a social-network graph, the publicly-
known attributes of a user would be (a subset of)
his connections (and interconnections amongst
them) within the graph.
Consider a simple unlabelled graph and an ad-
versary who knows that a target individual and
some number of his friends form a clique. In
the released graph, the adversary could look for
such cliques to narrow down the set of nodes that
might correspond to the target individual. The
goal of an anonymization scheme is to prevent
such an adversary from uniquely identifying the
individual and his remaining connections in the
anonymized graph.
We achieve this by introducing an anonymity
property that requires that for every node in the
graph, some subset of its neighbors should be
shared by other nodes. In this way, an adversary
who knows some subset of the neighbors of a tar-
get individual and can even pinpoint them in the
graph, will not be able to distinguish the target
individual from other nodes in the network that
share this subset of neighbors. Further, in the
process of anonymization, the identifying subset
of neighbors itself becomes distorted and harder
for the adversary to pinpoint. More formally we
define the (k, ℓ)-anonymity property as follows.
Definition 1 ((k, ℓ)-anonymity). A graph G =
(V,E) is (k, ℓ)-anonymous if for each vertex v ∈
V , there exists a set of vertices U ⊆ V not con-
taining v such that |U | ≥ k and for each u ∈ U
the vertices u and v share at least ℓ neighbors.
Example 1. A clique of n nodes is (n−1, n−2)-
anonymous.
(a) Input graph G
(b) (4,1)-anonymous transformation of G
Figure 1: In Figure 1(a) an adversary can iden-
tify Alice as the node marked X. Figure 1(b) is
a (4,1)-anonymous transformation of the graph.
To demonstrate the kinds of attacks we hope
to protect against, we give another example.
Example 2. Consider the graph in Figure 1(a).
Suppose an adversary knows that Alice is in this
graph and that Alice is connected to a friend who
is part of a triangle. There is only one such node
in the graph and hence the adversary will be able
to determine that the node marked X in the graph
uniquely corresponds to Alice. From this he may
be able to further infer the identities of Alice’s
neighbors and their neighbors as well. Now if
the edges shown in dotted lines in Figure 1(b) are
added to this graph, the resulting graph is (4, 1)-
anonymous. In this new graph, Alice is no longer
the only node connected to a node of a triangle.
Further, there is no longer only one triangle in
the graph.
Given an input graph G = (V,E) with n
nodes, and integers k and ℓ, our goal is thus
4
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Figure 2: Illustrative example of the difference
between weak and strong anonymity.
to transform the graph into a (k, ℓ)-anonymous
graph. We focus on transformations that al-
low only additions of edges to the original graph
In order for the anonymized graph to remain
useful for social-network (or other) studies, we
need to ensure that the transformed graph is
as close as possible to the original graph. We
achieve this by requiring that a minimum num-
ber of edges should be added to G so that
the (k, ℓ)-anonymity property holds. This leads
us to the following two variants of the (k, ℓ)-
anonymization problem.
Problem 1 (Weak (k, ℓ)-anonymization). Given
a graph G = (V,E) and integers k and ℓ, find the
minimum number of edges that need to be added
to E, to obtain a graph G′ = (V,E′) that is (k, ℓ)-
anonymous.
The following example illustrates the weak-
anonymization problem.
Example 3. Consider the input graph G of Fig-
ure 2(a). The graph consists of a clique of size
k and 2 nodes x and y connected by an edge.
The nodes in the clique are all (k − 1, k − 2)-
anonymous. However, the existence of x and y
prevents G from being fully (k−1, 1)-anonymous.
Assume now that we connect both x and y to
a single node u of the clique. In this way, we
construct graph G′ shown in Figure 2(b). Obvi-
ously, G′ is (k − 1, 1)-anonymous; all the nodes
in G′ (including x and y) have k−1 other nodes
that share at least one of their neighbors. For x
and y, this neighbor is node u.
The problem in the above example is that
graph G′ satisfies the (k − 1, 1)-anonymity re-
quirement, however, the anonymity of nodes x
and y is achieved via node u that was not a
part of their initial set of neighbors in G. Thus,
the goal of having many other nodes sharing
the original neighborhood structure of x or y
is not necessarily achieved unless we place ad-
ditional requirements on the anonymization pro-
cedure. To this end we introduce the problem of
strong anonymization. Strong anonymity places
additional restrictions on how anonymity can be
achieved and provides better privacy.
Definition 2 (Strong (k, ℓ)-transformation).
Consider graphs G = (V,E) and G′ = (V,E′),
so that E ⊆ E′ and G′ is (k, ℓ)-anonymous.
For fixed k and ℓ, we say that G′ is a strongly-
anonymized transformation of G, if for every
vertex v ∈ V , there exists a set of vertices U ⊆ V
not containing v such that |U | ≥ k and for each
u ∈ U , |NG(v)∩NG′(u)| ≥ ℓ. Here NG(v) is the
set of neighbors of v in G, and NG′(u) is the set
of neighbors of u in G′.
Therefore, if a graph G′ is a strong (k, ℓ)-
transformation of graph G, then each vertex in
G′ is required to have k other vertices sharing at
least ℓ of its original neighbors in G. For this
to be possible, every vertex must have at least ℓ
neighbors in the original graph G to begin with.
Example 4. Consider again the graph G of
Figure 2(a) and its transformation to graph G′
shown in Figure 2(b). In Example 3 we showed
that graph G′ is (k − 1, 1)-anonymous in the
weak sense. However, in order to get a strong
(k− 1, 1)-transformation of G, we would have to
connect each of the nodes x and y to k− 1 other
nodes from the clique.
The definition of a strong (k, ℓ)-transformation
gives rise to the following strong (k, ℓ)-
anonymization problem.
Problem 2 (Strong (k, ℓ)-anonymization).
Given a graph G = (V,E) and integers k and
ℓ, find the minimum number of edges that need
to be added to E, to obtain graph G′ = (V,E′)
that is a strong (k, ℓ)-transformation of G.
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Obviously achieving strong anonymity would
require the addition of a larger number of edges
than weak anonymity. This statement is formal-
ized as follows.
Proposition 1. Consider input graph G =
(V,E) and integers k and ℓ. Let G′ = (V,E′)
be the (k, ℓ)-anonymous graph that is the opti-
mal solution for Problem 1, and G′′ = (V,E′′)
be the (k, ℓ)-anonymous graph that is the opti-
mal solution for Problem 2. Then it holds that
|E′′| ≥ |E′|.
The notion of (k, ℓ)-anonymity is strongly re-
lated to the immediate neighbors of a node in
the graph, and how these are shared with other
nodes. Therefore, for every node u it is impor-
tant to know the nodes that are reachable from u
via a path of length exactly 2. Given its impor-
tance, we define the notion of 2-neighborhood of
a node as follows.
Definition 3 (2-neighborhood). Given a graph
G = (V,E) and a node v ∈ V we define the 2-
neighborhood of v to be the set of all nodes in
G that are reachable from v via paths of length
exactly 2.
We also define two more terms that will be
used in the rest of the paper.
Definition 4 (Residual Anonymity). Consider
a graph G = (V,E) that we would like to make
(k, ℓ)-anonymous. Consider any node v ∈ V and
suppose that k′ other nodes in the graph share
at least ℓ of v’s neighbors. Then, we define the
residual anonymity of v to be r(v) = max{k −
k′, 0}. The residual anonymity of a graph G =
(V,E) is defined to be r(G) =
∑
v∈V r(v).
We define the concept of a deficient node for
nodes that are not (k, ℓ)-anonymous.
Definition 5 (Deficient Node). A node v is de-
ficient if r(v) > 0.
It is the deficient nodes that we need to take
care of in order to anonymize a graph. With
these definitions in hand, we are now ready to
proceed to the technical results of the paper.
4 (2, 1)-anonymization
In this section we provide polynomial-time
algorithms for the weak and strong (2, 1)-
anonymization problems. First, it is easy to see
that there is a simple characterization of (2, 1)-
anonymous graphs. This fact is captured in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. A graph G = (V,E) is (2, 1)-
anonymous if and only if each vertex u ∈ V is
(a) part of a triangle, (b) adjacent to a vertex of
degree at least 3, or (c) is the middle vertex in a
path of 5 vertices.
The main idea of the algorithms that we de-
velop for (2, 1)-anonymization is that they add
the minimum number of edges so that every ver-
tex of the resulting graph satisfies one of the con-
ditions of Proposition 2. Both algorithms pro-
ceed in two phases: the deficit-assignment and
the deficit-matching phase. The deficit assign-
ment requires a linear scan of the graph in which
deficits are assigned to vertices. Roughly speak-
ing, a deficit of 1 signifies that the vertex needs
to be connected to another vertex of non-zero
deficit by the addition of an extra edge. This
added edge ensures that the (2, 1)-anonymity re-
quirement for the vertex or its neighbors will be
satisfied. Once the deficits are assigned to ver-
tices the algorithms proceed to the actual addi-
tion of edges. The edges are added by taking into
account the deficits of all vertices. For example,
two vertices both of deficit 1 can be connected
by the addition of a single edge (if they are not
already neighbors and are not isolated). In this
way, a single edge accommodates a total deficit
of 2. The minimum number of edges to be added
can be found via a matching of the vertices with
deficits. The matching consists of edges that are
not already in the graph. A perfect matching is
the matching that satisfies all the deficits. In the
case of weak anonymization, this matching can
be found in linear time by randomly pairing up
non-adjacent vertices with deficits. For strong
anonymization, it needs to be explicitly com-
puted by solving the maximum-matching prob-
lem over edges that are not already in the graph.
Another key point in the development of our
algorithms is that in order to assign deficits it
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suffices to explore only vertices that are within a
distance 4 from some leaf vertex or from a vertex
of degree 2. Any other vertex can be shown to
satisfy the conditions of Proposition 2. Finally,
it only requires a case analysis to show that our
algorithms optimally assign deficits to vertices,
independently of the order in which they traverse
the vertices of the input graph during the first
phase. For lack of space we only give a sketch of
the algorithms and proofs in this section.
4.1 Linear-time weak (2, 1)-anonymi-
zation
As we have already mentioned our algorithm
for the weak (2, 1)-anonymization problem has
two phases (1) deficit assignment and (2) deficit
matching1
Deficit Assignment: First assume that the
input graph has no isolated vertices – we will
show how to deal with isolated vertices later.
For the deficit-assignment phase, the algorithm
starts with an unmarked vertex of degree 1 or 2
and explores vertices within a distance 4 of it.
Deficits are assigned as follows:
• For an isolated edge uv, we assign deficit 1
to u and deficit 1 to v; it may be that both
edges will be added at u.
• For an isolated path uvw, we assign deficit
1 to v.
• For an isolated path uvwx, we assign deficit
1 to v and deficit 1 to w.
• For a subgraph consisting of a path uvw
with adjacent vertices attached to w, we as-
sign deficit 1 to v.
• For a component uvXi with vertex u having
degree one with vertex v connected to a set
of vertices Xi such that each x ∈ Xi has de-
gree 1 (and no other vertices) assign deficit
1 to v. This component corresponds to an
isolated star centered at v.
1Recall that a node u is assigned deficit i if i edges
need to be added between other non-zero deficit vertices
and u in order to satisfy the anonymity requirements of
u or u’s neighbors.
• For a component consisting of a square
uvwx (isolated square), we assign deficit 1
to u and deficit 1 to w; it may be that the
two edges will be added at u and v, or that
u and w will be joined.
• For a subgraph consisting of a square uvwx
with edges (one or more) uxi coming out of
the square, we assign deficit 1 to v.
• For a subgraph consisting of squares
uv1wx1, uv2wx2, . . ., uvjwxj , we assign
deficit 1 to one of the vi’s.
• Finally, for a subgraph consisting of a vertex
u adjacent to vertices xi of degree 1 and to
a vertex y of degree 2, assign deficit 1 to y.
All the vertices that are visited in this process
are marked (that is the assigned deficits cover
all marked vertices) and the deficit-assignment
process repeats starting with the next unmarked
vertex until no more unmarked vertices of degree
1 or 2 remain.
Deficit Matching: If the number of vertices
with deficit 1 is 2m, and 2m ≥ 4 or 2m = 2
– in some case other than an isolated edge uv
– then, we need to find any perfect matching
amongst these vertices to find the edges to add.
The matching of deficits can be done in linear
time since any (random) pairing of non-adjacent
vertices with non-zero deficits suffices. In this
case we add m extra edges. If the number of
vertices with deficit 1 is 2m+1, then all but one
of these vertices can be matched, and a single
edge needs to be added to the remaining vertex,
connecting it to some vertex of degree at least
2. This results in a total of m + 1 extra edges.
There are, however, some special cases that we
need to take care of first.
Special Cases: Before finding the perfect
matching we match all isolated edges to each
other. This is because the isolated edges need
to be connected in a special way to take care of
the deficits at the two ends. For a pair of isolated
edges uv and u′v′, we add the edges uu′ and vu′
(we treat the two deficits of 1 at u and v as being
concentrated at u). In the end we may be left
with a single isolated edge uv. In this case, two
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edges need to be added and we can connect them
to any other vertex in the graph forming a trian-
gle. Similarly, in the case where the remainder
is an isolated star centered at v with vertices xi
of degree one, it is enough to add a single edge
to connect vertices xj and xj′ of the star.
Isolated Vertices: It remains to take care of
isolated vertices. For this we consider a set of six
isolated vertices u, v, w, u′, v′, w′ and we connect
them with edges uv, uw, uu′, u′v′, u′w′. These
five edges can take care of the six isolated ver-
tices. In general, the vertices with deficit 1 can
be attached to isolated vertices first, with two ex-
ceptions to be considered next. When we have
an isolated edge xy, one of the two deficits of 1
can be satisfied by connecting x to an isolated
vertex, but the other one can also be satisfied
by connecting x to an isolated vertex u if u is
also made adjacent to two other isolated vertices
v and w to obtain the above mentioned compo-
nent. Similarly if x is only adjacent to vertices
yi of degree 1, then the deficit 1 at x can only be
matched to an isolated u if u is also made adja-
cent to two other isolated vertices v and w. In
the end we will be left with fewer than six iso-
lated vertices which each need one edge. These
can be connected to any vertex in the graph of
degree at least 2. The optimality follows because
a tree on 5 vertices is optimal saving.
Theorem 1. The above algorithm solves opti-
mally the weak (2, 1)-anonymization problem in
linear time.
Proof Sketch: It requires a case analysis (that
we omit for lack of space) to show that the
deficit-assignment scheme we described above is
complete and optimal and that the total deficit
assigned is independent of the order in which the
vertices of the graph are traversed. Since we find
a perfect matching, we satisfy these deficits with
as few edges as possible, hence, the optimality of
the algorithm.
It is also easy to see that the deficit-assignment
takes time linear with respect to the number of
edges in the graph: first we only consider vertices
of degree one or two as starting points. For every
such vertex we only have to explore all vertices
within a distance 4. This is because any other
vertex can be seen to satisfy one of the condi-
tions of Proposition 2. After each iteration of the
deficit assignment, we mark all the vertices that
have been visited in this process as marked (that
is the assigned deficits cover all visited vertices).
The deficit-assignment process continues start-
ing with the next unmarked vertex of degree 1
or 2. The scanning of the algorithm requires only
linear time with respect to the number of edges
in the graph since every traversed edge connects
only marked endpoints and thus no edge needs
to be traversed more than once by the algorithm.
The deficit-matching phase is also linear since
it only requires to find any (random) matching
between non-adjacent deficits.
4.2 Polynomial-time strong (2, 1)-
anonymization
The algorithm for solving the strong (2, 1)-
anonymization problem is very similar to the
one presented in the previous section, so we only
briefly discuss it here. For brevity we avoid men-
tioning various special cases that are similar to
the weak-anonymization problem. The first key
difference is that for strong (2, 1)-anonymization
we need to develop a different deficit-assignment
scheme. Although the actual structures we have
to consider for assigning the deficits are the same
we need to assign different deficits to different
vertices so that we satisfy the strong anonymity
requirement. This is because an edge added at
a vertex with assigned deficit can only help the
original neighbors of the vertex, and not the ver-
tex itself. The second difference is that in the
deficit-matching phase we need to actually solve
a maximum-matching problem; not every ran-
dom pairing of non-adjacent vertices with as-
signed deficit is a valid solution.
In strong (2, 1)-anonymization we first have
to assume that there are no isolated vertices
in the input graph G; otherwise strong (2, 1)-
anonymity is not achievable for these vertices.
Deficit Assignment: For the deficit-
assignment step, the algorithm starts with
an unmarked vertex in the input graph with
degree 1 or 2 and assigns deficits as follows:
• For an isolated edge uv, assign deficit of 2
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at each end.
• For an isolated path uvwx, put deficit 1 at
v and at w.
• For an isolated square uvwx, put deficit 1
at u and v.
• If such a square has edges already coming
out of v, put just deficit 1 at u.
• If multiple squares uviwxi all start from ver-
tex u, then assign deficit 1 to one of the vi’s.
• For a path uvw, put deficit 1 at each of the
3 vertices.
• For a vertex of degree at least 3 attached to
vertices of degree 1, put two deficits of 1 at
degree 1 vertices.
• If a path starts uvwx, with x of degree at
least 2, put deficit 1 at v and 1 at w.
• If in addition w has other edges coming out
of it, put deficit 1 just at v. Otherwise if in
addition only v has other edges coming out
of it that join to a vertex of degree 1, put
deficit 1 just at w.
All vertices that are visited in the process are
marked, and the algorithm proceeds with the
next unmarked vertex until there are no un-
marked vertices left.
Deficit Matching: For solving the strong (2, 1)
- anonymization problem exactly we need to
solve a maximum-matching problem between the
nodes with deficits. This can be done in polyno-
mial time ([13]). Note, that in the weak (2, 1)-
anonymization problem any random pairing of
non-adjacent nodes with deficits was sufficient,
allowing for a linear-time matching phase. This
was because with the exception of isolated edges
and isolated paths of length 4, there was no case
in which two vertices of non-zero deficit could
be adjacent. This is not the case in the strong
anonymization problem, and here a maximum-
matching problem needs to be solved over edges
that are not already in the graph.
A linear-time deficit-matching algorithm with
a small additive error can also be developed.
This is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The strong (2, 1)-anonymization
problem can be approximated in linear time
within an additive error of 2, and can be solved
exactly in polynomial time.
Proof Sketch: It requires again a case analy-
sis to show that the deficit-assignment scheme is
optimal and independent of the order in which
we traverse the vertices.
Now, if all deficits add up tom, they can easily
be paired using a greedy linear-time matching al-
gorithm. However, the last 2 deficits may be as-
signed to adjacent vertices. So instead of adding
⌈m/2⌉ edges, we may add ⌈m/2⌉+ 2, for an ad-
ditive error of 2. If instead we use a maximum-
matching algorithm to match as many deficits as
possible and satisfy the unmatched deficits indi-
vidually, the problem can be solved optimally in
polynomial time.
5 From (6, 1) to (7, 1)-anonymity
We show here that given a graph that is al-
ready (6,1)-anonymous, it is NP-hard to find
the minimal number of edges that need to be
added to make it either weakly or strongly (7,1)-
anonymous. This result provides insight into the
complexity of the anonymization problem, show-
ing that it is hard to achieve anonymity even
incrementally. The result follows from a reduc-
tion from the 1-in-3 satisfiability problem. An
instance of 1-in-3 satisfiability consists of triples
of Boolean variables (x, y, z) to be assigned val-
ues 0 or 1 in such a way that each triple contains
one 1 and two 0s. This problem was shown to
be NP-complete by Schaefer [15]. We first show
that even a restricted form of the 1-in-3 satisfia-
bility problem is NP-complete.
Lemma 1. The 1-in-3 satisfiability problem is
NP-complete even if each variable occurs in ex-
actly 3 triples, no two triples share more than
one variable, and the total number of triples is
even.
Proof. We prove this by taking an arbitrary in-
stance of the 1-in-3 satisfiability problem and
converting it to an instance satisfying the con-
straints of the above lemma. We start off by
renaming multiple occurrences of a variable x as
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x1, x2, and so on, so that by the end, each vari-
able occurs in at most 1 triple and no two triples
share more than one variable. We can then en-
force the condition that each xi be equal to xi+1
by inserting the triples (xi, u, v), (xi+1, u
′, v′),
(u, u′, w) and (v, v′, w). This guarantees at most
3 occurrences of each variable in triples. If a
variable y occurs in 2 triples, we may include a
triple (y, z, t) introducing two new variables, so
that at the end of this process each variable oc-
curs in either 1 or 3 triples. Finally we make
nine copies of the entire instance, each labeled
(i, j) with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, and equate the zs that
have the same i and also equate the ts that have
the same j. This guarantees that each variable
appears in exactly 3 triples. Making two copies
of this instance guarantees that the number of
triples is even.
Theorem 3. Suppose G is (6, 1)-anonymous.
Finding the smallest set of edges to add to G
to solve the weak or strong (7, 1)-anonymization
problem is NP-hard. The same results hold for
going from (k, 1)-anonymity to weak or strong
(k + 1, 1)-anonymity when k ≥ 6.
Proof. We show this via a reduction from the 1-
in-3 satisfiability problem. We take an instance
of the 1-in-3 satisfiability problem satisfying the
constraints of Lemma 1. We further assume that
the number of triples in this instance is a mul-
tiple of 3, since if it is not a multiple of 3, it
is easy to see that there will be no satisfying as-
signment. Since we also assume that the number
of triples is even, the number of triples is in fact
of the form 6m.
Taking this instance, we now form a cubic bi-
partite graph G = (U, V,E) by creating a vertex
in U for each triple and a vertex in V for each
variable, with the two vertices connected by an
edge if the variable occurs in the triple. We add
5 new neighbors of degree 1 to each vertex in
U . Each of these added neighbors and the ver-
tices in V are (7, 1)-anonymous, but the vertices
in U have only 6 vertices at distance 2, namely
the 2 other neighbors of each of the 3 neighbors
in V , giving (6, 1)-anonymity. We would like to
increase the anonymity of these vertices so that
they are also (7, 1)-anonymous. Note that a so-
lution to this anonymity problem has to consist
of at least m edges. This is because the total
residual anonymity of the graph is 6m and each
new edge can reduce the residual anonymity by
at most 6. Now, if it were possible to select 2m
vertices in V that were adjacent to all the 6m
vertices in U , we could insert a perfect matching
of m edges between these 2m vertices and simul-
taneously increase the anonymity of all the ver-
tices in U by at least 1. This would correspond
to a solution to the 1-in-3 satisfiability problem.
Similarly, if there is a solution to the anonymity
problem that involves the addition of only m
edges, it must necessarily correspond to a solu-
tion to the 1-in-3 satisfiability problem. Thus a
solution to the 1-in-3 satisfiability problem ex-
ists if and only if the solution to the anonymity
problem involves the addition of m extra edges.
For k ≥ 6, add k−2 nodes of degree 1 attached
to each vertex in U . Attach an additional node
of degree k − 5 to each vertex in U . Attach the
remaining k−6 neighbors of each such additional
node to a clique of size k + 2. The result then
follows from the case of k = 6.
The complexity of minimally obtaining weak
and strong (k, 1)-anonymous graphs remains
open for k = 3, 4, 5, 6.
6 (k, 1)-anonymization
We start our study for the (k, 1)-anonymization
problem by giving two simple O(k)-
approximation algorithms. We then show
that the approximation factor can be further
improved to match a lower bound.
6.1 O(k)-approximation algorithms
for (k, 1)-anonymization
Let G = (V,E) be the input graph to the weak
(k, 1)-anonymization problem. Consider the fol-
lowing simple iterative algorithm: at every step i
add to graph Gi (G1 = G) a single edge between
a neighbor of a deficient node u and a node that
is not already in the 2-neighborhood of u in Gi.
If there are only isolated deficient nodes in Gi,
the algorithm directly connects a deficient node
to a node of a (k + 1)-clique. If no such clique
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exists, the algorithm creates it in a preprocess-
ing step; (k + 1) randomly selected nodes are
picked for this purpose. Repeat the process un-
til no deficient nodes remain. We call this algo-
rithm the Weak-Any algorithm. We show that
Weak-Any is an O(k)-approximation algorithm
for the weak (k, 1)-anonymization problem. This
result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Weak-Any gives a O(k)-
approximation for the weak (k, 1)-anonymization
problem. If the optimal solution is of size t,
Weak-Any adds at most 4kt+ k2 edges.
Proof. Let R =
∑
v∈V r(v) be the residual
anonymity (see Definition 4) of graph G =
(V,E). Let Wa be the total number of edges
added by the Weak-Any algorithm. It holds that
Wa ≤ R + k2. This is because at every step
the algorithm adds one edge that decreases the
residual anonymity of the graph by at least 1.
Therefore the algorithm adds at most R edges.
The additional k2 edges may be required to cre-
ate a (k+1)-clique if such a clique does not exist.
Now assume that the optimal solution adds t
edges. Consider an edge uv of the optimal so-
lution. This edge, at the time of its addition,
could have decreased the residual anonymity of
the graph by at most 4k. This is because it could
have decreased the residual anonymity of each of
u and v as well as the residual anonymities of at
most k neighbors connected to u and at most
k neighbors connected to v (if u or v had more
than k neighbors, then none of these neighbors
would have been deficient). Further, the edge uv
could have decreased the residual anonymity of
u or v by at most k, and the residual anonymi-
ties of each of the k neighbors of u or each of the
k neighbors of v by at most 1.
Thus, each edge of the optimal solution could
have reduced the residual anonymity of the
graph by at most 4k at the time of its addition.
That is, t ≥ R/4k.
Thus it is clear that Wa ≤ 4kt+ k2.
For the strong (k, 1)-anonymization problem
we show that the Strong-Any algorithm (very
similar to Weak-Any), is an O(k)-approximation.
Strong-Any is also iterative: in each iteration
i it considers graph Gi and adds one edge to
it. The edge to be added is one that connects
a neighbor of a deficient node u to a node that
is not already in the 2-neighborhood of u. This
process is repeated till no deficient nodes remain.
We can state the following for the approximation
ratio achieved by the Strong-Any algorithm.
Theorem 5. Strong-Any is a 2k-approximation
algorithm for the strong (k, 1)-anonymization
problem.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 4 consider
input graph G = (V,E) with initial resid-
ual anonymity R. Every edge added by the
Strong-Any algorithm would reduce the residual
anonymity of the graph by at least 1. Therefore,
if the number of edges added by the Strong-Any
algorithm is Sa we have that Sa ≤ R.
Suppose now that the optimal solution adds t
edges. An added edge uv decreases the residual
anonymity of the graph by at most 2k. This
is because the edge can decrease the residual
anonymity of only the original neighbors of u and
v by at most 1 each and there can be at most 2k
such deficient neighbors. Thus t ≥ R/2k.
From the above we have that Sa ≤ 2kt.
6.2 Θ(logn)-approximation algorithms
for (k, 1)-anonymization
We now provide two simple greedy algorithms for
the weak and strong (k, 1)-anonymization prob-
lems and show that they output solutions that
are O(log n)-approximations to the optimal. We
then show that this is the best approximation
factor we can hope to achieve for arbitrary k.
We start by presenting Weak-Greedy which
is an O(log n)-approximation algorithm for the
weak (k, 1)-anonymization problem. Consider
input graph G = (V,E) that has total residual
anonymity R. The optimal solution to the prob-
lem consists of a set of edges that together take
care of all the residual anonymity in the graph.
We may be tempted to use a set-cover type so-
lution: greedily choose edges to add that maxi-
mally reduce the residual anonymity of the graph
at each step. However, such a greedy algorithm
is not so easy to analyze in the context of the
weak-anonymization problem. The difficulty in
the analysis stems from the fact that the new
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Figure 3: Illustrative example of the rein-
forcement between new edges in the weak-
anonymization problem.
edges may reinforce each other. That is, the ad-
dition of an edge may bring about a greater re-
duction in the residual anonymity of the graph in
the presence of other added edges. Consider, for
example, the input graph G shown in Figure 3.
Note that solid lines correspond to the original
edges in G. In this case, the addition of edge
x2z1 alone does not help in the anonymization
of node y2. (Neither does the addition of edge
y2z1 in the anonymization of x2). However, if
edge y2z1 is already added in the graph, then
edge x2z1 helps in anonymizing node y2 as well.
We get around this peculiarity of our prob-
lem by greedily choosing triplets of edges to add
instead of singleton edges. Algorithm 1, called
Weak-Greedy, describes the procedure.
Algorithm 1 Weak-Greedy for weak (k, 1)-
anonymization
1: //Input: k,G = (V,E)
2: Randomly choose a node w ∈ V
3: Add up to
(
k+1
2
)
edges to E to form a k+1-
clique at w
4: Compute R = residual anonymity of G
5: while R > 0 do
6: Find triplet uv, uw, vw that maximally de-
crease R
7: E = E ∪ {uv} ∪ {uw} ∪ {vw}
8: Update R
9: end while
Theorem 6. Weak-Greedy is a polynomial-time
nearly O(log n)-approximation algorithm for the
weak (k, 1)-anony- mization problem. If the op-
timal solution is of size t, the algorithm adds
k2 + 6t log n edges.
Proof. Consider the optimal solution of t edges.
These t edges together take care of all the resid-
ual anonymity in the graph. We can convert this
solution to a solution of triplets that consists of
at most k2 + 3t edges: first randomly choose
a node w and create a (k + 1)-clique amongst
w and k other randomly chosen nodes. Then,
for each edge uv of the optimal solution, add
a triangle (uv, vw, uw) to the graph. The re-
sulting graph will clearly continue to be (k, 1)-
anonymous. The t triangles in conjunction with
the (k + 1)-clique take care of all the residual
anonymity in the graph. Further, these triangles
do not reinforce each other because they are all
connected to a node of degree k.
Going back to Algorithm 1, this means that
once a (k+1)-clique has been added to the graph,
at each iteration of the algorithm, there must
exist some triangle with a vertex in the (k + 1)-
clique that reduces the residual anonymity of the
graph by a factor of at least t (similar to the
argument for the greedy set cover algorithm).
And since the algorithm greedily chooses tri-
angles to add, the residual anonymity of the
graph will decrease by at least this factor at
each step. Since the residual anonymity of the
graph can be at most kn < n2 to begin with,
the algorithm will only proceed for at most r
iterations till (1 − 1/t)r ≤ 1/kn. This would
mean that r = O(t log(kn)) = O(2t log n) and
3r = O(6t log n).
The approximation algorithm for the strong
(k, 1)-anony- mization problem is simpler, since
added edges cannot reinforce each other — an
added edge can only help the original neighbors
of its two end points. Algorithm 2 gives the de-
tails of the Strong-Greedy algorithm.
Algorithm 2 Strong-Greedy for (k, 1)-
anonymization
1: //Input: k,G = (V,E)
2: Compute R = residual anonymity of G
3: while R > 0 do
4: Find edge uv that maximally reduces R
5: E = E ∪ {uv}
6: Update R
7: end while
Since the added edges do not reinforce each
other in the strong (k, 1)-anonymization prob-
12
lem, the analysis of Strong-Greedy is similar to
the analysis of the greedy algorithm for the stan-
dard set-cover problem.
Theorem 7. Strong-Greedy is a polynomial-
time 2 log n-approximation algorithm for the
strong (k, 1)-anonymization problem.
Proof. Suppose the optimal solution adds t
edges, to reduce the residual anonymity of the
graph by at most kn < n2. Since edges of
the solution do not reinforce each other, there
must exist some edge that reduces the residual
anonymity of the graph by at least a factor of t.
Therefore at each iteration of Algorithm 2,
we greedily choose an edge to add that must
cause at least this much reduction in the resid-
ual anonymity of the graph. The algorithm will
thus terminate after r steps where (1− 1/t)r ≤
1/(kn), or r = t log(kn) ≤ 2t log n.
We next show that log n is the best factor we
could hope to achieve for unbounded k, for both
the weak and strong (k, 1)-anonymization prob-
lems via an approximation-preserving reduction
from the hitting set problem.
Theorem 8. The weak and strong (k, 1)-
anonymization problems with k unbounded are
Ω(log n)-approximation NP-hard.
Proof. Hitting set is Ω(log n)-approximation
NP-hard. Consider an instance of the hitting-
set problem consisting of sets S = {S1, S2, . . .}.
Let k be greater than the maximum number of
sets intersecting any one set Si. Add a unique
element vi to each Si. Additionally, construct
sets T = {T1, T2, . . .} such that each Ti contains
the appropriate vi’s so that every Si intersects
exactly k − 1 other sets. In every set Ti add an
additional element w so that each set in T in-
tersects at least k other sets. Now construct a
bipartite graph G = (U, V,E), where the vertices
of U correspond to the sets in S and T , the ver-
tices of V correspond to individual members of
these sets, with E indicating membership of ele-
ments from V in sets from U . For every element
u in U create (k + 1) new vertices of degree 1 in
V and connect them to u. In the resulting graph,
the vertices in V are all (k, 1)-anonymous, how-
ever the vertices in U that correspond to sets in
S are only (k − 1, 1)-anonymous. Consider the t
nodes in V that are the optimal solution to the
hitting-set problem. Then matching these nodes
using ⌈t/2⌉ edges will be an optimal solution to
the strong or weak (k, 1)-anonymization problem
in the bipartite graph G = (U, V,E). Therefore,
an optimal solution to the anonymization prob-
lem corresponds to an optimal solution to the
hitting-set problem which is Ω(log n)-hard to ap-
proximate.
7 (k, ℓ)-anonymization for ℓ > 1
In this section we provide algorithms for the
weak and strong (k, ℓ)-anonymization problems
when ℓ > 1.
The algorithm for weak (k, ℓ)-anonymization
is a randomized algorithm that constructs a
bounded-degree expander between deficient ver-
tices. Given a (k, ℓ′)-anonymous graph G, it
solves the weak (k, ℓ)-anonymization problem by
adding only O(
√
k − k′)ℓ) additional edges at
each vertex. The algorithm can also be easily
adapted to solve the weak (k, ℓ)-anonymization
problem for any input graph irrespective of its
initial anonymity.
Theorem 9. There exists a random-
ized polynomial-time algorithm that adds
O(
√
(k − k′)ℓ) edges per vertex and increases
the anonymity of a graph from (k′, ℓ) to (k, ℓ)
where ℓ ≤ k ≤ n1−ǫ and ǫ is a constant greater
than 0.
Proof Sketch: Randomly partition the n
vertices into n/ℓ sets of size ℓ. Treat each set as
a “supernode”. Construct an expander of degree√
(k − k′)/ℓ on these n/ℓ supernodes. In this
way each supernode has (k − k′)ℓ supernodes in
its 2-neighborhood that can be reached through
just one intermediate supernode. Replace each
edge uv of this expander with a Kℓ,ℓ clique
of edges between the constituent vertices of
the supernodes u and v. Thus each vertex
now has k − k′ vertices in its 2-neighborhood
that can be reached through an intermediate
set of size ℓ. Since l ≤ k ≤ n1−ǫ, we can
show that with high probability, none of these
k − k′ new vertices will coincide with the k′
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vertices previously in the node’s 2-neighborhood.
As a final result, we present the algorithm for
strong (k, ℓ)-anonymization. This algorithm is a
generalization of the Strong-Greedy algorithm
(see Algorithm 2). The difference is that instead
of picking a single edge to add at every itera-
tion the algorithm picks edges in groups of size
at most ℓ. At each iteration it picks the group
that causes the largest reduction in the resid-
ual anonymity of the graph. The pseudocode is
given in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Strong-Greedy for (k, ℓ)-
anonymization
1: //Input: k, ℓ,G = (V,E)
2: Compute R = residual anonymity of G
3: while R > 0 do
4: Find set of edges E , with |E| ≤ ℓ, that
maximally reduces R
5: E = E ∪ E
6: Update R
7: end while
We can state the following theorem for the ap-
proximation factor of Algorithm 3 when ℓ is a
constant.
Theorem 10. Consider G = (V,E) to be the
input graph to the strong (k, ℓ)-anonymization
problem. Also assume ℓ is a constant. Let t be
the optimal number of edges that need to be added
to solve the strong (k, ℓ)-anonymization problem
on G. Then Algorithm 3 is a polynomial-time
O(tℓ−1 log n)-approximation algorithm.
Proof Sketch: In the (k, ℓ)- anonymization
problem, groups of up to ℓ edges at a time in-
cident at a single vertex can reduce the residual
anonymity of a vertex adjacent to the ℓ endpoints
of these edges. The t edges added by the opti-
mal solution define at most tℓ subsets of at most
ℓ edges incident to a single vertex. By selecting
such subsets greedily as in a set-cover problem we
ultimately reduce the residual anonymity of the
graph to 0 in O(tℓ log n) steps. We can show that
reinforcement effects between subsets of edges
are taken care of. This proves the O(tℓ log n)
bound on the number of edges selected. If ℓ is
a small constant, the approximation factor may
not be too large. Further, in practice this simple
algorithm may perform better than this worst
case bound indicates.
8 Conclusions
Motivated by recent studies on privacy-
preserving graph releases, we proposed a new
definition of anonymity in graphs. We further
defined two new combinatorial problems aris-
ing from this definition, studied their complexity
and proposed simple, efficient and intuitive algo-
rithms for solving them.
The key idea behind our anonymization
scheme was to enforce that every node in the
graph should share some number of its neigh-
bors with k other nodes. The optimization prob-
lems we defined ask for the minimum number of
edges to be added to the input graph so that
the anonymization requirement is satisfied. For
these optimization problems we provided algo-
rithms that solve them exactly (k = 2) or ap-
proximately (k > 2).
An interesting avenue for future work would be
to fully characterize the kinds of attacks that our
definition of anonymity protects against, and to
study the impact of our anonymization schemes
on the utility of the graph release.
Finally, we believe that the combinatorial
problems we have studied in this paper are in-
teresting in their own right, and may also prove
useful in other domains. For example, at a high
level there is a similarity between the problem we
study in this paper and the problem of construct-
ing reliable graphs for, say, reliable routing.
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